This article traces the development of BAT's cigarette distribution network in China. It demonstrates that BAT utilised the connections that expatriate managing agencies had developed with Chinese merchants in the treaty port economy of Shangai during the late nineteenth century, and shows how these linkages were subsequently developed into a distribution network to serve the whole of China. The keys to the success of BAT's selling organisation in China lay in two main areas of competence: first, the company's ability to develop accounting and credit control systems that both monitored its cigarettes and minimised the risk of bad debts; and, secondly, in its ability to foster competition within its own sales teams by creating parallel distribution mechanisms throughout much of China, in particular through the creation of a joint venture with the Chinese-run Wing Tai Vo Corporation. By the 1930s BAT's products were widely available in China, despite the upheavals that acted to undermine the development of a national market there.
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international business co-ordination during the twentieth century -were preceded in this function during the nineteenth century by the international operations of a variety of business institutions. Organisations such as trading houses, investment groups, managing agencies and free-standing companies evolved over the course of the nineteenth century into complex international networks which assumed the tasks of developing foreign markets for industrial goods and managing foreign investments, well before American-inspired multinational corporations (like BAT Co.) took root.
Although these international business networks have tended to be studied independently of conventional multinational enterprises, as alternative systems of international business management, it is clear that the success of BAT Co. in China cannot be properly appreciated without reference to the pioneering role played by the more tradeoriented organisations which preceded it. The operations of agencies such as Mustard & Co.
and Rex & Co., that had acted as distributors for the products of BAT Co.'s founder companies, were fundamental in developing linkages with Chinese traders that BAT later skilfully exploited, and upon which so much of their eventual success was based. In addition, the earliest attempt to utilise the most modern cigarette manufacturing technology within China involved a collaboration between mercantile elements in Shanghai and an Americanbased industrial enterprise, intermediated by an American trading organisation. Such complex networks were an important and necessary feature of foreign direct investment and technology transfer in the era preceding the development of modern multinational corporations. 8 Even after BAT had established themselves as the leading enterprise dealing in manufactured cigarettes in China, the company's managers still found themselves facing a steep learning curve. Before they were able to effectively deal with the problems involved in marketing a foreign product in the Chinese economy -particularly in those regions which lay beyond the treaty ports 9 -the company was forced to experiment with various strategies. Not surprisingly, BAT's initial approach was centred on an effort to replicate the type of 5 distribution mechanism which its main parent company, the American Tobacco Co. (ATC), had utilised in the United States. Given the problems faced by foreign firms operating in those parts of China where the legal provisions of the treaty ports were not valid, however, such a strategy was fraught with difficulties. As political conditions became still more problematic in China following the revolution of 1911, it became apparent to BAT that the creation of a truly national sales network for their products would require the involvement of Chinese merchants at a high level of responsibility, and that the key to financial success would be the creation of mechanisms through which these merchants' activities could be effectively managed.
II
In common with many other staple consumer goods, the processing of tobacco was radically transformed during the late nineteenth century by the introduction of mechanised production.
The branch of the industry where the greatest change occurred was in cigarette-making, an activity which traditionally had been a semi-skilled task practised by hand. As the market for cigarettes in America and Britain grew during the 1880s, a number of cigarette-making machines were designed. The most efficient of these proved to be a model developed by an American inventor, James A. Bonsack. In 1883 Bonsack had exhibited his machine in Paris, hoping to interest the French state tobacco monopoly in his invention. Whilst on display there, it attracted the attention of a major British cigarette manufacturer, the Bristol firm of W.D. & H.O. Wills, who were sufficiently impressed to carry out tests of the machine at their own factory. Wills' directors quickly concluded that the machine was the best currently on offer and purchased Bonsack's patent for use in Britain. The decision proved to be instrumental in enabling Wills to emerge as Britain's leading cigarette manufacturer in the years before 1900. 10 In America, where Bonsack's early efforts to find a buyer for his machine had been frustrated, the first manufacturer who was willing to adopt it seriously, W. 6 Duke Sons & Co., was able to negotiate a much more favourable rate for its use than any of its American rivals. By pressing home this cost advantage Duke's company forced its way into a position of leadership in cigarette-manufacturing and by 1890 Duke had been able to browbeat his four main competitors into an amalgamation. With James B. Duke installed as its President, the newly-created American Tobacco Company (ATC) commenced its commercial life with a virtual monopoly over mechanised cigarette production in America.
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The profitable exploitation of Bonsack's invention required a high volume of output and sales, and thus was dependent upon generating rapid growth in the demand for machinemade cigarettes. During the 1890s, both ATC in America and Wills in Britain introduced marketing innovations which persuaded numerous consumers to adopt this new tobacco product. 12 In addition, both firms began to explore outlets abroad for their cigarettes and, as the new century approached, the two found themselves competing in a number of countries, most notably in the British colonies of Australia and South Africa, and in the Far Eastern markets of Japan and China. The two firms also clashed in Britain, where Duke's firm had developed an export trade during the mid 1880s. Higher duties on manufactured tobacco imports, compared with the raw leaf, meant that domestic firms such as Wills enjoyed a significant degree of effective protection against imported American cigarettes, and the adoption of mechanised cigarette production by other British firms severely squeezed the market share of imported cigarettes. 13 Duke, however, was unwilling to be edged out of the For a period of twelve months, ATC and the constituent firms of the Imperial company, It was this agreement that created BAT Co. as a jointly (but not equally) owned subsidiary of ATC and Imperial, and it specified that the new joint venture would take possession of the two firms' overseas operations. To this end, the agreement explicitly allocated to BAT Co. During its early years, when the preponderant share of BAT's Chinese sales and all of its small amount of local manufacturing were focused on Shanghai, Mustard & Co. used its 13 links with the local Chinese merchants to create a selling agency known as the Shanghai Tobacco Guild. Initially, six wholesale merchant firms were appointed to undertake the main task of distribution through the framework of the Guild, one of which was Wing Tai Vo. 43 Mustard's control of this Guild, which had expanded to embrace twenty Chinese firms by 1916, provided BAT with an effective sales network in Shanghai; the merchants traded only in BAT products and formed exclusive deals with local retailers which acted as a barrier to the products of rival domestic cigarette manufacturers. 44 BAT's early dominance of the cigarette market in Shanghai threatened to be seriously disrupted when a widespread campaign to boycott American products erupted in the middle of 1905. 45 The boycott presented small-scale Chinese tobacco manufacturers with an opportunity to gain access to BAT's Shanghai market, and it was during this campaign that The treaty port agreements of the nineteenth century, which governed economic relations between the Qing government in Beijing and the Western Powers, limited foreign economic involvement in China to the purposes of mercantile trade. At the conclusion of the SinoJapanese War of 1894-95, however, the Chinese authorities had been obliged by the terms of the peace treaty signed at Shimonoseki to allow the commencement of foreign investment in the treaty ports. 47 After the boycotts of 1905 it became apparent to BAT's top managers that the company would need use this newly-gained concession to expand their manufacturing capacity in China and reduce their dependence on relatively high-cost imported cigarettes. 48 Manufacturing cigarettes directly within the treaty ports would enable the firm to compete effectively with low-cost native cigarette producers, and to develop the market for their cigarettes beyond Shanghai. With this latter aim in mind, it was also clear that commercial expansion in China would require the formation of a distribution network under the company's control which was capable of channelling cigarettes beyond the treaty ports to those consumers located within the interior.
The individual charged with the responsibility of developing BAT's operations in
China beyond the limits of the treaty port economies, James Thomas, had already gained experience of working in the tobacco markets of the Far East before joining ATC in 1899.
He had been seconded to BAT Co. on its formation by James Duke, who placed him in control of the company's operations in India. 49 On his transfer to Shanghai in 1905, therefore, Thomas was able to bring to the post both the knowledge he had gained from his experience abroad, and an appreciation of the workings of Duke's ATC organisation in America. The former experience convinced Thomas of the importance of adhering to the local trading infrastructure and customs, and of the need to market cigarettes at a price denominated in an appropriate local coin. The latter experience provided the basic blueprint for the production and distribution structure that he set about creating in China. 15 In his capacity as managing director of the American (later British) Cigarette Co., and also as a director of production sites were capable of supplying the company's distribution networks with around 70 per cent of their total sales -a level of output in excess of 5 billion cigarettes (100,000 cases) per annum (see Tables 1 and 2 ). 51 The influence of Duke's ATC organisation on Thomas' strategy in China is revealed by reference to the managerial structure adopted by the British Cigarette Co. As he set about the task of establishing BAT as the leading supplier of cigarettes across the whole of the Chinese Empire, Thomas adopted the centrally co-ordinated organisational management structure of the ATC. From his headquarters at 22 Museum Road in Shanghai, Thomas exerted authority over a small group of executives whose departments were responsible for carrying out the functions of purchasing, manufacturing, and marketing. 52 BAT's long-term strategy in China, implemented by Thomas, focused on building a nationwide distribution structure which was under the company's control and which could be co-ordinated with the output of a small number of high-volume factories located directly within China. The strategy was clearly inspired by the experience of the tobacco industry in America, where the rapid growth of cigarette sales during the 1880s had encouraged the largest manufacturers to take a more active role in the distribution process. 16 Traditionally, American tobacco manufacturers had merely employed a few travelling salesmen to make contact with local jobbers and retailers, while the bulk of the trade remained in the hands of independent wholesalers who supplied small retailers with a variety of goods, of which tobacco was only one. However, during the mid-1880s the largest cigarette manufacturers began to set up their own warehouses to serve dealers in the largest cities. The effect of this was to eliminate many commission merchants and some of the largest urban jobbers from the distribution system for cigarettes in the United States. 53 In America, therefore, by creating their own regional distribution centres, the cigarette manufacturers had introduced a measure of forward integration into the tobacco industry. In
China, James Thomas attempted to replicate this policy, as far as was practicable, by developing a distribution system which divided the Chinese market beyond the Shanghai area into a series of regional sales territories, each of which was placed under the control of a Territory Manager, supervised by the Sales Department of the Shanghai headquarters. Two strategies were then employed to manage this China-wide territorial distribution system.
Firstly, a number of foreign salesmen were recruited by BAT whose task it was to supervise these territories and to promote the company's goods in collaboration with Chinese sales teams. These foreigners were supported by Chinese interpreters (compradors) a number of whom ultimately took on direct management roles within the BAT sales organisation. 54 Secondly, a series of warehouses were created in the main towns of China to receive and distribute the products manufactured in the company's factories. Where these warehouses were located outside the jurisdiction of the treaty ports, native Chinese were employed as depot-keepers to manage the stocks. Thomas' principal achievement in China was his creation of a management system capable of administering these two elements of the distribution process.
The foreign salesmen recruited by Thomas were mainly young Americans, drawn primarily from the tobacco-growing areas of North Carolina and Virginia. The standard contract of employment for these young men involved a continuous period of four years 17 abroad, followed by four months home leave. 55 A bonus was awarded to those who learned sufficient Chinese to pass the company's examination. 56 One such employee, James
Hutchison, began working in China during 1911 as a travelling salesman around Beijing
[Peking] before graduating into the role of a Territory Manager two years later. 57 His early work included tours of local towns accompanied by a Chinese sales crew armed with advertising material (posters and handbills) and samples of the products. 58 One of the tasks of these travelling BAT salesmen was to monitor the market conditions in the different parts of the country to which they travelled. This was undertaken through the completion of Form 163, a survey of market conditions which had been designed by Thomas during his early excursions into the field. The form was completed monthly by all of the company's travelling representatives as they visited dealers, before being returned to the company's headquarters in Shanghai. It set out the prevailing conditions for each town in terms of population, dealers operating, depot facilities available, stock levels by brand, the local currency exchange rate and the general income levels of the inhabitants. 59 Duke had understood well the importance of accurate information of this kind, and his chief accountant in New York, W.R. Harris, created an accounting system for the American organisation, based around daily reports on brand sales by town, in order to keep stocks flowing smoothly. 60 Thomas adapted this procedure to the needs of the China market, in particular to pricing cigarettes at an appropriate level in the local currency. 61 During its first ten years in operation, the distribution system created by Thomas and managed by his American sales team continued to evolve. As the geographical scope of the sales network expanded, individual territories would be grouped together to form small Sales Divisions. The three main focal points of this network emerged as the treaty ports of Shanghai, Tianjin [Tientsin] in the north, and Hankou [Hankow] situated inland from Shanghai along the Yangtze basin, although important adjuncts were the operations in Manchuria, centred in Shenyang
[Mukden], and Hong Kong, the latter at this point still controlled directly from London.
Important as the American and other foreign salesmen were to the company's early growth in China, the expansion of BAT's distribution system also necessitated the increasing participation of Chinese merchants. One reason for this lay in the provisions of the trade treaties themselves which prevented foreigners from owning land outside of the treaty ports and thus presented BAT with severe problems in terms of expanding their network of warehouse provision. To overcome this it was necessary to develop a system of warehouses which were under the ownership of Chinese nationals. In addition, BAT needed to tap into the well-established Chinese trading networks that already delivered goods extensively within China. 62 This required a system of dealers to be developed using contract arrangements which, as far as possible, ensured the security of BAT's goods as they passed through a complex Chinese distribution mechanism towards the ultimate retailers and hawkers.
The means by which the company expanded their distribution system to incorporate
Chinese dealers was through the development of two legally-binding contracts, Forms 15A and 16A, which, like Form 163, were introduced by Thomas. The Form 15A was designed to enable BAT to appoint independent Chinese merchants as godown (depot) managers for their stocks. The agreement permitted BAT to furnish large-scale depots with adequate stocks by retaining ownership of the goods until such time as they were released to the dealers. 63 Thus, although the 15A depots were independent concerns, in contrast to the company's own depots located within the treaty ports, the 15A agreement enabled BAT to transfer stocks to them without foregoing their right of title to such goods until they actually left the depot. This arrangement was supported by the Form 16A, which was a Guarantee Bond signed by all of BAT's appointed dealers. Before a Chinese merchant was appointed to deal in the company's goods, he needed several tens of thousands of Yuan as capital and a permanent premises for dealing exclusively with BAT's goods. Additionally, in order to receive goods on credit, a distributor needed to be able to offer BAT two guarantors each of which constituted a firm with a permanent place of business. 64 The role of the 16A Guarantee Bond was to act as a security against stocks held by the dealer. By signing the 16A agreement, each dealer pledged 19 a fixed amount of compensation to the company, calculated by taking the credit limit allowed to the dealer in question and adding a 25 per cent margin, as guarantee against the loss of stocks held by him.
These arrangements provided BAT with the security they needed to extend credit to their dealers, who were then allocated goods on a consignment basis of no more than 30 days after they had been drawn from the depot. In areas too remote for the company to set up depot facilities, the main Association dealers were permitted to draw stocks on behalf of Subdealers, under similar guarantee arrangements, thus effectively performing the wholesaling function. 65 The ordinary shares and offer them to the existing directors at 30 shillings each. These shares, which had a market value of around £5, were available for purchase over a period of four years on condition that the directors did not act in a similar capacity for any other tobacco company. A total of 280,228 of these shares were allocated to James Duke alone. 66 Secondly, the growing popular antipathy towards foreigners which had helped to destabilise the Qing regime caused Thomas to experiment with the creation of a sales network which was managed directly by Chinese merchants rather than by Western salesmen.
In 1912, two of the company's most trusted Chinese servants, Zheng Bo Zhao (by now the manager of the Wing Tai Vo distribution agency) and Wu Ting Sheng (a BAT employee), accompanied Thomas on a visit to London for a meeting with BAT's top management. 67 Following their return to China, Zheng Bo Zhao became the first Chinese agent to be allocated sole agency for a BAT brand, "Ruby Queen", across the whole of China, rather than just in the Shanghai region. Meanwhile, with a similar aim in mind, Wu Ting Sheng was co-opted into a new initiative. 21 Wu had first been hired by Thomas as his interpreter at the age of twenty, and had been instrumental in helping the Western tobacco merchant to establish the Shanghai Tobacco Trade Guild. 68 immediately appointed as an agent of the Enterprise Tobacco Co., by whom it was exclusively allocated within China the brands "Purple Mountain" and "New York". 71 The
Union Trading Company, 72 in which Wu Ting Sheng now became a shareholder, was designed to develop a distribution network for BAT's cigarettes that would cover the whole of China, and which appeared, to outside observers, to be operated by a high profile member of the Chinese urban gentry. Significantly, it was also expressly designed "for the purpose of creating competition among the salesmen in China." 73 As a subsidiary company, BAT allowed Union much more generous credit arrangements than their existing Chinese agencies and hence the organisation was able to deal in much greater volumes of cigarettes. Using this advantage, Union rapidly expanded sales of the company's products as Wu, applying his influence and offering incentives to dealers, made early progress. 74 These initial successes of the Union Trading Company 22 proved impossible to sustain, however, and towards the end of the decade the enterprise began to run into serious financial difficulties. For all his political influence, Wu did not have sufficiently deep roots in the mercantile community and was unable to maintain the company's growth. 75 In These distributors were given exclusive rights to deal in the brands of "Ruby Queen" and "Vanity Fair" (a lower grade brand) within the limits of each specified Sales Division, and were themselves to appoint Association dealers and Sub-dealers in each of the villages, towns and districts served by the sub-depot within their designated division. 85 Thus BAT now 25 operated two independent sales organisations, acting in competition with each other, across the entire Chinese market. Vo a brand named "Victory". The combination of Zheng's sales network and BAT's competitive strength meant that the "Red House" threat was quickly nullified. 88 The key to Zheng's ability to rapidly expand BAT's sales lay in his willingness to offer generous credit terms to his dealers. Whereas BAT had been obliged to place stringent conditions on its Chinese distributors in terms of guarantees, in order to safeguard itself, the regional solidarity which characterised Zheng's network of Cantonese merchants allowed him to adopt much less restrictive conditions. 89 Zheng required much less in terms of the capital value of distributors, he extended credit on the strength of only one guarantor and on a much more lenient basis, and he even paid interest on money that was lodged with him as security.
As a result, Wing Tai Vo was able to rapidly expand its network of distributors. 90 By September 1920, sales of "Ruby Queen" had set a new monthly record for the company in China of 11,462 cases and the company found it necessary to resume production of cigarettes for China, which had been transferred to America in 1916, at their factory in Liverpool. The complementary nature of the location-specific knowledge, which these agencies possessed, and the process-and product-specific knowledge of the cigarette manufacturers, encouraged the development of a partnership between them. For such a partnership to be successful, however, it was necessary for the transfer of process-and product-specific knowledge to involve more than the simple transplantation of machinery. In addition, an important element of tacit knowledge was required in order for the manufacturing process to be adjusted appropriately to local conditions. The failure of the American Cigarette Co. Forging links with expatriate agency houses such as Mustard and Rex constituted the cigarette manufacturers' first step in creating a distribution system to serve their needs in China. 93 One major drawback of these institutions, however, was that their direct area of influence in China rarely extended beyond the treaty ports of Shanghai and Hong Kong. 94 Rex & Co.'s links with Wing Tai Vo were therefore especially valuable because they provided BAT with access to one of the traditional trading associations whose networks, founded upon the strength of regional collegiality, extended deeply into the Chinese economy. 95 In contrast to Mustard and Rex, BAT's objectives in China were far more ambitious than simply providing cigarettes within the treaty port economies. Under the managerial guidance of James Thomas, BAT soon began to look beyond those limited horizons. 29 On assuming control in Shanghai, therefore, Thomas began to step up local production facilities and recruited an expatriate sales team who, supported by salaried Chinese interpreters, could take these low-priced cigarettes "up-country" and establish relations with the traditional Chinese merchant houses that managed China's internal trade.
During the ten years in which Thomas was in control of BAT's operations in Shanghai, the company established an extensive network of Chinese dealers who conducted warehousing arrangements for them beyond the treaty ports, and who took responsibility for the distribution of their products to the final consumer. So effective did these links with Chinese merchants become, that, by the latter part of the 1920s, the need for Western salesmen to engage in travelling had more or less ceased. 96 This reliance on Chinese merchant groups has led Cochran to dispute the originality of BAT's distribution system, and to question whether BAT's entry into China actually led to the creation of something which, in economic terms, could be considered as novel. 97 Certainly, as time passed, it was increasingly the Chinese merchants who managed the physical process of distributing BAT's cigarettes to the consumers. In addition, there can be little doubt that BAT's Western salesmen would have found it extremely difficult to operate without the support of their Chinese interpreters/compradors, to whom they were thus obligated. However, these marketing activities represented only the physical manifestation of the distribution system that BAT created in China. Supporting this field organisation was a system of management accounting, implemented by Thomas through his Accounting Department in Shanghai, which monitored its operation. This system ensured that the dealers obtained those supplies that their customers required, that the company's warehouses and dealers were not overstocked, that the credit allowed to dealers was kept to the minimum level commensurate with their needs, and that the revenues generated by the operation as a whole were properly accounted for and received by the company. These systems of market intelligence, of dealer guarantees, and of financial accounting procedures, were the products 30 of Western business expertise that BAT's management introduced into early twentieth century China.
Managing a distribution mechanism comprising almost entirely of Chinese dealers was a key to BAT's success in China. Beyond this, however, it is important to recognise that the company also maintained a competitive edge by creating rivalry between different parts of its own sales organisation. This is evidenced by the schemes with Wu Ting Sheng and the Lopato family and, most successfully, with Zheng Bo Zhao's Wing Tai Vo operation. James
Duke himself had come to appreciate in the United States that the benefits of large scale production could easily be dissipated by the dulling effect that a monopoly position could have on sales performance. 98 A striving to maintain rivalry within the sales operation, whilst gaining the maximum economies of scale in production, thus emerges as a continuous thread in the competitive strategy implemented by BAT's management in China during this period.
BAT's crowning achievement within China was to oversee a distribution network that transcended in scope any of the individual Chinese trading associations which had hitherto carried out China's internal trade. It did this ultimately, not by creating a fully-blown distribution mechanism of its own making, but by instituting an administrative framework that brought within its organisational compass a great many of the established trading firms that were already serving the traditional Chinese economy and by allowing certain of the elements within this distribution mechanism to compete against one another.
BAT's long-term success in China lay less in their ability to protect the concentrated urban markets of the cities against competitors, than in their ability to provide cigarettes to customers in the furthest reaches of China. As Table 3 and its ability to generate rapid growth of sales in these areas, rather than a monopoly control of the large urban markets, which accounted increasingly for its continued growth in sales and its strong national market share.
Individually, the scope of the indigenous trading networks was relatively limited. Thus BAT were able to develop a thriving business enterprise in China because they were willing and able to adapt the expertise which they had already mastered, in the production and distribution of cigarettes, to the conditions that prevailed within China. On arriving in the Far East, BAT, and James Thomas in particular, were prepared to continue the process of learning. It was this willingness to learn and adapt that makes an analysis of BAT's operations in China between 1902 and 1941 so fruitful an example of the potentially successful marriage which could be made between Western business methods and the 32 traditional mercantile institutions of China. Table 4 for breakdown between BAT and WTV from 1923 onwards. According to a Chinese source, BAT's reported profits from its China for the period 1902-41 amounted to approximately £50 million. However, it suggests that, taking into account such things as inflated raw material imports, excessively high salaries paid to the Western managers, unrealistically high depreciation, and the reserves retained as cash, the actual level of profit amounted to something more in the region of £82.5 million for the period. Shanghai (ed.) Ying Mei, p.1536. What is not in dispute is that BAT's operations in China provided a mainstay of the company's income, particularly after the first ten years. Duke himself is reported by the trade press in 1915 as stating that, "It has taken many years to build up our business in China. It is only now being put on a paying basis. We were willing to take a loss there for ten years because we saw great possibilities in the country." Tobacco, No. 410, (February 1915), p.37. Of course, his reported losses are likely to be partly designed to deter rival tobacco firms in the U.S.A., who had gained their independence following the dissolution of the American Tobacco Company a little over two years earlier, from emulating BAT's strategy in China.
